Undeclared DGs emerge as growing air cargo safety risk

The global air cargo and mail supply chain is facing an evolving range of safety and security risks linked to Dangerous Goods (DGs) that are undeclared, misdeclared, or deliberately weaponised, according to industry concerns.

The risks have increased alongside the rapid growth of e-commerce, the widespread use of lithium batteries in consumer products, increasingly complex supply chains and the emergence of improvised incendiary devices targeting cargo operations.

According to a report shared by White Paper, more than 81% of dangerous goods incidents reported to IATA during the referenced period involved undeclared dangerous goods, which numbered 2,798 in total, followed by 7% of cases under Incorrect/Mising/Illegible labeling/Marking, 5% under Damage (no release), 4% as Misdeclared, 2% as Incorrect/Insufficient packaging and 1% under Spillage/Leakage release.

Regulated movement of dangerous goods
DGs are classified into nine main classes covering all modes of transport, including air freight. These categories encompass more than 3,500 substances and articles, ranging from explosives and lithium batteries, including power banks, to flammable liquids and gases, corrosive materials and radioactive substances.

Such goods are routinely transported by air under established international safety standards and regulations. Their carriage is governed by provisions set out in ICAO Annex 18, the ICAO Technical Instructions (Doc 9284), IATA IOSA Standards, and the IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations (IATA DGR).

Distinguishing legitimate and unlawful DG
Despite cases involving misdeclaration or malicious intent, industry stakeholders stress the need to distinguish between DGs that are legitimately transported under established regulations and those that are unlawfully concealed, undeclared, misdeclared, or weaponised.

The intentional introduction of such materials into the air cargo supply chain can pose serious risks to aircraft safety and may constitute an offence. More than 90% of ICAO Contracting States have ratified the Montreal Convention (1971) and its Supplementary Montreal Protocol (1988), which address offences and acts that can jeopardise the safety of civil aviation.

Lithium battery incident highlights risks
One of the recent incidents happened in March, 2026, when the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) proposed a $260,000 civil penalty against World Event Promotions (WEP), a Coral Gables, Florida-based company, for allegedly violating hazardous materials regulations. According to the FAA, WEP offered three shipments of battery packs containing lithium-ion batteries to United Parcel Service (UPS) for air transportation. Lithium-ion batteries are classified as hazardous materials under US regulations.

In one case, employees at a UPS sorting facility in Ontario, California, discovered that the shipment was smoking and that the package had developed a burn hole. The FAA alleges the shipments were not accompanied by the required hazardous materials documentation and were not properly classified, described, packaged, marked, or labelled. The agency also said the batteries were offered for transport with a state of charge exceeding 30% of their rated capacity and that WEP failed to provide the required emergency response information.

Flexibility in cargo screening
At the international level, Annex 17 provides flexibility in cargo security measures. While systematic screening is required for staff, passengers, cabin baggage and hold baggage, requirements for cargo, mail and other goods are less prescriptive. This allows trained screening personnel to select the most appropriate screening method based on the nature of the cargo.

As cargo screening technologies, software and detection algorithms continue to advance, their ability to identify dangerous goods is expected to improve. However, greater detection could also lead to more shipments requiring interception, verification and physical inspection, increasing pressure on operational resources.

Without adequate planning, staffing and infrastructure, the additional inspection workload could reduce screening capacity, slow cargo processing and potentially disrupt air cargo operations.

Need for a layered approach
A layered approach integrating both safety and security measures is essential for the air cargo sector, as per the report. The approach is highlighted as significant considering the speed, global reach, and complex network of stakeholders involved in air cargo. Freight forwarders, handlers, airlines, shippers, regulated agents, known consignors, customs authorities, safety and security agencies, and airport operators all contribute to the movement of cargo, creating potential vulnerabilities at different stages.

Existing aviation security frameworks can support supply chain safety, but additional safety oversight should not automatically fall to security authorities or personnel. Over-reliance on screening technologies could increase false alarms, reduce throughput, and add interception and verification costs. Operational risk management should determine when screening is necessary, the acceptable level of risk, and the residual risk from dangerous goods that remain undetected, balancing aviation security with efficient cargo movement.

The report highlights the need for a balanced, risk-based approach that strengthens safety and security without creating unnecessary disruption to cargo operations. Effective coordination, targeted screening, and clear oversight will remain critical as the air cargo supply chain continues to evolve.